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INTRODUCTION
“Reasonable and articulable suspicion” is generally
understood as the Fourth Amendment standard the Supreme
Court chose in Terry v. Ohio 1 as the basis for brief investigative
stops by police officers. Articulable suspicion is a lawyer’s
* George R. Ward Associate Professor of Law, UNC School of Law. My research
assistants, Lorelle Babwah, Andrew Kasper, and Matthew Nigriny provided invaluable
assistance. Christopher Slobogin, Ronald Wright, Donald Dripps, Dan Markel, and my
UNC faculty colleagues improved the article with thoughtful advice.
1 392 U.S. 1, 30 (1968).
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standard. Judgesand lawyers generally—are partial to words,
which are their stock-in-trade. But much of what matters to
people in the world is incredibly difficult to reduce to language.
Moreover, many people, including some otherwise talented police
officers, may lack the linguistic capacity to successfully recount
their experiences in language that lawyers and judges can use in
court. This Article considers the portion of the “totality of the
circumstances” that lies beyond the articulable, exploring the
limitations of witness testimony regarding fast-moving events,
and the ways in which technology will alter the margins of
practice on the street and in the courtroom.
As this Article is being written, the background
understandings of human cognition and its effect on police
practice are shifting. Emerging science on cognitive processes is
introducing new challenges into the courtroom. On the one hand,
some social scientists are explaining human behavior in ways that
make it possible for law enforcement officers to translate their
heretofore inarticulable experiences into words. On the other, the
findings of other scientists who study the nature of expertise
suggest that the traditional Terry inquiry, with its focus on
conscious thought, may be missing much of the picture. Expert
police officers process much of the critical information on which
they rely at a subconscious—and therefore inarticulable—level.
The better they get at their job, the less likely they are to make
conscious note of classes of information, especially in the
potentially life-threatening situations that may lead to frisks for
weapons. Additionally, the process of preparing for the Terry test
may be driving some information out of police officers’ memories,
at the same time it seeks to capture other information. Police
officers, as much as, and perhaps more than other eyewitnesses,
are susceptible to verbal displacement.
And officer memory may not be the best evidence available.
In the twenty-first century, digital recorders are proliferating—
they can be found in police cars, on officers’ lapels, on witness cell
phones, in retail security systems, the list expands daily. These
technological advances are making it possible for many officers,
and many suspects, to bring video or audio recordings of their
experiences to court. Fourth Amendment doctrine must explicitly
make room for these technological advances. If, as this Article
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argues, “reasonable and articulable” suspicion is really a subset of
“reasonable suspicion based on credible evidence,” then digital
video and audio recordings should serve as a new, affordable, and
widely available adjunct to officer testimony that fits nicely into
this broader doctrinal framework.
This Article proceeds in four parts. Part I examines briefly
the legal regime established by the Supreme Court and commonly
referred to by the name of the seminal case, Terry v. Ohio, and
suggests that the totality-of-the-circumstances approach adopted
by the Court is broader than the traditional “reasonable and
articulable suspicion” formulation. 2 Part II examines some of the
developments in cognitive science that have implications for the
application of the Terry standard. It examines new law
enforcement applications of the emerging science of precognitive
facial expression, which makes the previously inarticulable
articulable. This new application is changing the landscape
underneath Terry. It then looks at the naturalistic decisionmaking literature, a branch of psychology of expertise, and
suggests that Terry may be asking a question that is poorly suited
to the environment in which officers operate, and to the nature of
their expertise. It finally considers some recent research on
witness memory, and suggests that the process of preparing to
meet the Terry standard may be introducing to the courtroom
inaccuracies that are real, albeit difficult to quantify. Part III
briefly considers some of the policy implications of the interaction
between cognitive science and police conduct under the Terry
regime. It suggests that the protection offered under the Terry
standard may be slowly eroding, even as its presence may be
creating a false sense of confidence that “the courts” are the
answer to the age-old query, “Who watches the watchers?” 3 Part
IV considers the viability of digital video as an adjunct to or
substitute for officer testimony. We may have a new answer to
who watches: the digital video camera.

Id.
Commonly attributed to the plays of Juvenal, the question in Latin is Quis
custodies ipsos custodiet.
2
3
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I. TERRY AND REASONABLE AND ARTICULABLE SUSPICION
The language “reasonable and articulable suspicion” is
immediately familiar to any student of criminal procedure.4 It is
the Fourth Amendment standard 5 articulated by the Supreme
Court in the Terry line of cases as the minimum basis required for
brief investigative stops by police officers. These brief,
investigative “Terry stops” 6 are police-citizen encounters short of a
full arrest, but where appropriate they may include a “frisk” for
weapons. 7 As this Section will show, the courts have given
increasing deference to the police regarding the bases for such
stops, but they have retained their prerogative to review police
behavior, even if the standard is more deferential than probable
cause. “The stop and frisk rule permits the police to engage in
what most people regard as reasonable and essential law
enforcement activity but requires them to pay attention to all of
the circumstances they confront and to articulate a reason for
their actions that may be judicially reviewed.” 8
Courts applying the Terry standard in its current state of
evolution may consider a broad range of suspect conduct, such as
nervousness, evasive behavior, flight, and responses to questions. 9
In reviewing the propriety of an officer’s conduct, courts do
not have available empirical studies dealing with
inferences from suspicious behavior, and this Court cannot
reasonably demand scientific certainty where none exists.
4 For an excellent discussion of the rise of the Terry standard, see Stephen A.
Saltzburg, Terry v. Ohio: A Practically Perfect Doctrine, 72 ST. JOHN’S L. REV. 911
(1998).
5 The Fourth Amendment states, in full:

The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and
effects, against unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be violated, and
no Warrants shall issue, but upon probable cause, supported by Oath or
affirmation, and particularly describing the place to be searched, and the
persons or things to be seized.
U.S CONST. amend. IV.
6 See generally WAYNE R. LAFAVE, 1 SEARCH AND SEIZURE: A TREATISE ON THE
FOURTH AMENDMENT § 9.1 (4th ed. 2009).
7 A frisk is a limited pat-down of the outer clothing of a suspect to check for
weapons. Id. at 5. If an object that might be a weapon is felt under a suspect’s clothing,
it can be removed for visual examination. Id.
8 Salzburg, supra note 4, at 962.
9 LAFAVE, supra note 6.
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Thus, the reasonable suspicion determination must be
based on commonsense judgments and inferences about
human behavior.10
In Terry itself, Martin McFadden, a police officer with thirty-nine
years of experience as a Cleveland police officer, observed three
men who were, in his estimate, “casing a job, a stick-up.” 11
McFadden described the elaborate sequence of events in which the
men walked back and forth in front of a store for ten to twelve
minutes, and stopped on the corner to talk with a third man,
before returning to once again stare into the window. 12 The police
officer stopped the men, and asked them some questions. 13
Worried for his safety, he quickly frisked the men for weapons by
patting down their outer clothing, and felt concealed firearms on
two of them. 14 The men were arrested and convicted on weapons
charges. 15
Terry’s appeal was based on the absence of probable cause to
arrest him. 16 The Court, in an opinion written by Justice Warren,
agreed, but held that the absence of probable cause was not the
end of the inquiry. 17 The government argued that such
encountersbecause they fell short of full arrestwere outside
the purview of the Fourth Amendment. 18 Justice Warren wrote
that the Fourth Amendment did apply, but that there was an
entire rubric of police conduct—necessarily swift action
predicated upon the on-the-spot observations of the officer
on the beat—which historically has not been, and as a
practical matter could not be, subjected to the warrant
procedure.19 Instead, the conduct . . . must be tested by the

10
11
12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19

Illinois v. Wardlow, 528 U.S. 119, 119 (2000).
Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 6 (1968) (quoting McFadden’s testimony).
Id.
Id. at 6-7.
Id. at 7.
Id. at 8.
Id. at 25.
Id. at 20.
Id. at 10.
Id. at 20.
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The Court further held that the standard was objective, not based
on the officer’s subjective good faith. 21 Judged after the fact, the
circumstances must be those that would have led a reasonable
person to believe that the stop and frisk were warranted. 22 Given
the suspicious behavior that Officer McFadden observed, he was
justified in making a brief investigative stop. 23 Moreover, the
limited search for weapons that he conducted was reasonable
under the circumstances. 24
Cases since Terry have referred to the standard as requiring
reasonable and articulable suspicion. 25 The officer must be acting
on more than an “inchoate and unparticularized suspicion or
‘hunch’” 26 of criminal activity, but may bring experience and
training to bear to allow seemingly innocuous information to be
considered as part of the totality of the circumstances. Terry was
originally framed as a narrow exception to the Fourth Amendment
requirement that officers have probable cause before searching or
seizing a person or property.27 In Terry, the Supreme Court
empowered police officers to stop and frisk a suspect if the officer
had a reasonable and articulable suspicion that “criminal activity
[was] afoot” and the suspect was armed and dangerous. 28 This
narrow exception, based on a standard less rigorous than probable
cause, was substantially expanded in subsequent decisions,
Id.
Id. at 21.
22 Id. at 21-22.
23 Id. at 23.
24 Id. at 28-29.
25 Illinois v. Wardlow, 528 U.S. 119, 123 (2000) (“In Terry, we held that an officer
may, consistent with the Fourth Amendment, conduct a brief, investigatory stop when
the officer has a reasonable, articulable suspicion that criminal activity is afoot.”).
Justice Harlan’s language in his Terry concurrence most closely matches the current
formulation: “Where such a stop is reasonable, however, the right to frisk must be
immediate and automatic if the reason for the stop is, as here, an articulable suspicion
of a crime of violence.” Terry, 392 U.S. at 33 (Harlan, J., concurring). A Westlaw search
for the phrase “articulable suspicion” in the allfeds database on August 16, 2010
yielded more than 3,800 results. A similar search in allcases hits the 10,000 result
limit.
26 Terry, 392 U.S. at 27.
27 LAFAVE, supra note 6, § 9.1(c).
28 Terry, 392 U.S. at 30 (alteration to original).
20
21
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leading some commentators to express concern that the exception
was beginning to swallow the rule.29
Since Terry was decided, the law has evolved in two key
ways. First, the lower courts have expanded the original scenario,
involving violent crimes or suspects thought to be armed and
dangerous, to include crimes that are not inherently violent, such
as burglaries and drug offenses, and to allow searches of suspects
in certain cases where there is no direct evidence that the suspect
is armed or dangerous. 30 Second, some observers have argued that
trial courts have shown a willingness to “unquestioningly accept
the testimony of police witnesses,” significantly reducing the
amount of evidence that will meet the standard. 31
In a 1994 article, Professor David Harris noted that much of
the expansion of Terry up to that point had occurred at the trial
and intermediate appellate court levels, with the Supreme Court
continuing to characterize Terry as a narrow exception to the
probable cause requirement. 32 However, the Court’s recent Fourth
Amendment decisions appear to embrace—and arguably even
expand—the broader conception of Terry previously adopted by
the lower courts. In two of its most recent Terry decisions, United
States v. Arvizu 33 and Illinois v. Wardlow, 34 the Supreme Court
overturned lower court decisions to suppress evidence based on a
restrictive view of the scope of Terry. 35
29 David A. Harris, Frisking Every Suspect: The Withering of Terry, 28 U.C. DAVIS
L. REV. 1, 5 (1994); Gregory H. Williams, The Supreme Court and Broken Promises: The
Gradual But Continual Erosion of Terry v. Ohio, 34 HOW. L.J. 567, 576-83 (1991); see
also Michael J. Roth, Note, Berkemer Revisited: Uncovering the Middle Ground
Between Miranda and the New Terry, 77 FORDHAM L. REV. 2779, 2800-03 (2009); Jamie
L. Stulin, Comment, Does Hiibel Redefine Terry? The Latest Expansion of the Terry
Doctrine and the Silent Impact of Terrorism on the Supreme Court’s Decision to Compel
Identification, 54 AM. U. L. REV. 1449, 1456-58 (2005).
30 Harris, supra note 29, at 23-32.
31 Id. at 33.
32 Id. at 5-6.
33 534 U.S. 266, 268 (2002).
34 528 U.S. 119, 121 (2000).
35 Arvizu, 534 U.S. at 277 (holding that court below incorrectly suppressed
evidence from vehicle search, where border patrol officer stopped vehicle after
observing defendant driving on road frequented by drug smugglers and seeing children
in back seat waving oddly); Wardlow, 528 U.S. at 125 (holding that Illinois Supreme
Court incorrectly suppressed evidence obtained during stop and frisk of defendant who
ran away from police vehicle that was entering high crime area, despite police officer’s
inability to remember whether police car was marked or unmarked). In a third case,
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While courts have substantially liberalized their inquiry
under Terry, it remains an important cornerstone of Fourth
Amendment law. Other scholars have written extensively on
Terry. 36 It has been variously described as a “practically perfect
doctrine,” and as a dismal failure. 37 It has been described as
revolutionary, and as evolutionary. 38 Others have suggested that
the balance in Terry itself was correct, but that subsequent
decisions have tipped the balance in favor of the police, 39 and yet
others suggest that Terry’s strength is that it is flexible enough to
move back and forth with the times.40 Other critics have noted
Hiibel v. Sixth Judicial District Court, 542 U.S. 177, 191 (2004), the Court held that a
state may require a suspect to disclose his name during a Terry stop without violating
the Fourth Amendment. While the majority maintained that Hiibel was not
inconsistent with previous Terry decisions, id. at 188, commentators have argued that
Hiibel diverges from earlier opinions stating that suspects cannot be required to
answer questions during Terry stops. See Stulin, supra note 29, at 1456-63. One
notable exception to this trend towards an expansive interpretation of Terry is Florida
v. J.L., 529 U.S. 266 (2000), where the Court held that an “anonymous tip that a
person is carrying a gun, is, without more, [in]sufficient to justify a police officer’s stop
and frisk of that person.” Id. at 268.
36 See, e.g., Wayne R. LaFave, Two Hundred Years of Individual Liberties: Essays
on the Bill of Rights: Pinguitudinous Police, Pachydermatous Prey: Whence Fourth
Amendment “Seizures”?, 1991 U. ILL. L. REV. 729 (1991); Christopher Slobogin, Let’s
Not Bury Terry: A Call for Rejuvenation of the Proportionality Principle, 72 ST. JOHN’S
L. REV. 1053 (1998); Gregory H. Williams, The Supreme Court and Broken Promises:
The Gradual But Continual Erosion of Terry v. Ohio, 34 HOW. L.J. 567, 576 (1991)
(arguing that the Court struck the right balance in Terry but later decisions
undermined that balance).
37 See Tracey Maclin, When the Cure for the Fourth Amendment is Worse Than the
Disease, 68 S. CAL. L. REV. 1, 35 (1994) (arguing that Terry’s rationale has been
distorted to justify ever-more intrusive police conduct); Saltzburg, supra note 4, at 912
(arguing that Terry strikes a “practically perfect” balance). See generally Adina,
Schwartz, Just Take Away Their Guns: The Hidden Racism of Terry v. Ohio, 23
FORDHAM URB. L.J. 317, 331 (1996) (arguing that Terry weakened the rights of
defendants of all races when it broadened the basis for admissibility of evidence); Scott
E. Sundby, An Ode to Probable Cause: A Brief Response to Professors Amar and
Slobogin, 72 ST. JOHN’S L. REV. 1133, 1136-37 (1998) (discussing tension between
individual liberties and police power).
38 Slobogin, supra note 36, at 1095 (“Terry didn’t alter law enforcement practices; it
just provided, in the hands of the post-Warren Court, a rationale for the status quo.”).
39 Williams, supra note 36, at 576 (arguing that the Court struck the right balance
in Terry but later decisions undermined that balance).
40 See Craig S. Lerner, Judging Police Hunches, 4 J.L. ECON. & POL’Y 25, 39-40
(2007); Scott E. Sundby, A Return to Fourth Amendment Basics: Undoing the Mischief
of Camara and Terry, 72 MINN. L. REV. 383, 402 (1988) (“[R]easonable suspicion
became a valid compromise standard that comports with the [F]ourth [A]mendment if
the Court decides that, after balancing the interests, it is reasonable. The government
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that different and even contradictory information has been
accepted by trial courts as an acceptable basis for an investigative
stop, leading to a perception of oversight, even though the courts
are simply ratifying officers’ judgments so long as they offer any
justification for their actions.41
Since Terry was decided, the courts have emphasized that the
issue is a practical one. In United States v. Cortez, 42 Chief Justice
Burger, writing for the majority, emphasized the inherent
difficulties that come with applying the standard, and also
recognized that the courts would give deference to the
particularized training of police officers:
Courts have used a variety of terms to capture the elusive
concept of what cause is sufficient to authorize police to
stop a person. Terms like “articulable reasons” and
“founded suspicion” are not self-defining; they fall short of
providing clear guidance dispositive of the myriad factual
situations that arise. But the essence of all that has been
written is that the totality of the circumstances—the whole
picture—must be taken into account. Based upon that
whole picture the detaining officers must have a
particularized and objective basis for suspecting the
particular person stopped of criminal activity.
The idea that an assessment of the whole picture must
yield a particularized suspicion contains two elements,
each of which must be present before a stop is permissible.
First, the assessment must be based upon all of the
circumstances. The analysis proceeds with various
objective observations, information from police reports, if
such are available, and consideration of the modes or
patterns of operation of certain kinds of lawbreakers. From
these data, a trained officer draws inferences and makes
deductions—inferences and deductions that might well
elude an untrained person.

no longer argues against a presumed starting point of probable cause but rather argues
for reasonable suspicion as a reasonable accommodation of competing interests.”).
41 Charles L. Becton, The Drug Courier Profile: “All Seems Infected that th’ Infected
Spy, As All Looks Yellow to the Jaundic’d Eye,” 65 N.C. L. REV. 417, 444-47 (1987).
42 449 U.S. 411 (1981).

946

MISSISSIPPI LAW JOURNAL

[VOL. 81:5

The process does not deal with hard certainties, but with
probabilities. Long before the law of probabilities was
articulated as such, practical people formulated certain
common sense conclusions about human behavior; jurors
as factfinders are permitted to do the same—and so are
law enforcement officers. Finally, the evidence thus
collected must be seen and weighed not in terms of library
analysis by scholars, but as understood by those versed in
the field of law enforcement.
The second element contained in the idea that an
assessment of the whole picture must yield a
particularized suspicion is the concept that the process just
described must raise a suspicion that the particular
individual being stopped is engaged in wrongdoing. Chief
Justice Warren, speaking for the Court in Terry v. Ohio,
supra, said that “[t]his demand for specificity in the
information upon which police action is predicated is the
central teaching of this Court’s Fourth Amendment
jurisprudence.” 43

II. NEW THINGS TO ARTICULATE WITHIN THE EXISTING
PARADIGM
A. A Lawyer’s Standard
Make no mistake; articulable suspicion is a lawyer’s
standard. Judges—and lawyers generally—have an inherent bias
in favor of words.44 Words are the lawyer’s stock-in-trade.
Ordinarily, experiences that cannot be reduced to words cannot be
explained in a way that makes them available as evidence in
court, and they are unreviewable by appellate judges, who depend
on a written record. Lawyers are trained for years in the art of
rearranging emotional responses to issues into legal arguments, to
use the language of the law to reinterpret their prior experience so
that it fits into the existing structure. One shortcoming inherent
in a language-based system is that much of what matters to
Id. at 417-18 (citations omitted) (quoting Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 21 n.18
(1968)).
44 See Lerner, supra note 40, at 25 (“The legal system in practice rewards those
officers who are able and willing to spin their behavior in a way that satisfies judges,
while it penalizes those officers who are less verbally facile . . . .”).
43
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people in the world is incredibly difficult to reduce to language.
Another is that many people lack the linguistic capacity to cast
their experiences, no matter how real they have been, in language
that lawyers and judges can use in court. It naturally creates
biases in favor of the articulable portion of experience, and the
articulate portion of the population.
The world of Terry is undergoing an important change.
Whether and how much that change will ultimately affect the
gross number of searches that the courts allow to meet the Terry
standard remains to be seen. Nonetheless, social scientists such as
Paul Ekman in the area of facial expression of emotion 45 and Ray
Bull and Aldert Vrij in the science of distinguishing truth from
lies, 46 are creating a scientific framework that makes it possible
for law enforcement officers to translate their previously
unexplained experiences into words. Training in their methods
will make it possible for the police to introduce heretofore
inaccessible evidence regarding their experiences in court. If
judges credit the new science, more searches will meet the
reasonableness threshold.
How many cases this will affect is impossible to predict. Some
courts already have been willing to accept vague language about
facial expression and behavior because they understand that
describing in detail how someone looks and acts can be
challenging. Paul Ekman and the other social scientists who have
adopted or adapted his methods for studying human expression
and emotion have created a system that permits highly specific
45 See infra at notes 47-67 and accompanying text; see also PAUL EKMAN,
EMOTIONS REVEALED: RECOGNIZING FACES AND FEELINGS TO IMPROVE COMMUNICATION
AND EMOTIONAL LIFE (2d ed. 2003) [hereinafter EMOTIONS REVEALED]; PAUL EKMAN,
TELLING LIES: CLUES TO DECEIT IN THE MARKETPLACE, POLITICS AND MARRIAGE (3d ed.
2001) [hereinafter TELLING LIES]. Ekman’s work, and its possible applications police
investigations, has been explored recently in the television series Lie to Me. According
to his website, he “frequently advises police departments, anti-terrorism groups, and
animation studios.” See The Truth Behind the Lies: Evening Seminar, SMITHSONIAN
RESIDENT
ASSOCIATES
PROGRAM,
http://residentassociates.org/ticketing/tickets/
reserve.aspx?performanceNumber=219398 (last visited Nov. 1, 2010).
46 See, e.g., ALDERT VRIJ, DETECTING LIES AND DECEIT: THE PSYCHOLOGY OF LYING
AND ITS IMPLICATIONS FOR PROFESSIONAL PRACTICE (2000); Aldert Vrij, Criteria-Based
Content Analysis: A Qualitative Review of the First 37 Studies, 11 PSYCHOL. PUB. POL’Y
& L. 3 (2005); Aldert Vrij, Katherine Edward & Ray Bull, Stereotypical Verbal and
Nonverbal Responses While Deceiving Others, 27 PERS. & SOC. PSYCHOL. BULL. 899
(2001).
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description of observed facial expression. Ekman’s system has the
potential to change the way people, including the police, perceive
and describe people’s facial expressions. The Facial Action Coding
System Ekman and Wallace Friesen created has more than fifty
possible components of an expression. 47 The components of an
expression are created by the contraction of numerous facial
muscles, some of which most people have conscious control over,
and some of which most people leave to their autonomic muscles.
The example Ekman uses is the difference between the “PanAmerican” smile, the say-cheese smile that has appeared in photo
albums everywhere, looks posed and never reaches the eyes, and a
genuine smile, which activates different muscles 48 around the
nose and eyes. 49 Many people can tell the difference between a
true smile and a false smile. Far fewer have the training or the
vocabulary to explain why one was false and the other was not.
Subject those untrained people to skilled cross-examination
in a courtroom, and the results will not be pretty. But give them
some training, and things might change considerably. The officer
who previously thought something was not right will be able to
explain what it was that he saw that was not right. Instead of the
processing taking place subconsciously, it can be moved to the
conscious level. This has implications under Terry because it will
allow the basis for suspicion to be articulable.

B. The Underlying Scientific Claim: Precognitive Facial
Expression
The basic scientific claims underlying the science of
precognitive facial expression are fairly simple and somewhat
intuitive. First, basic facial expressions related to human emotion
are biologically, not socially determined.50 They are “hardwired”
and are the same across cultures, barring some abnormality. 51
47 PAUL EKMAN & WALLACE V. FRIESEN, THE FACIAL ACTION CODING SYSTEM
(1978).
48 EKMAN, TELLING LIES, supra note 45, at 150-51.
49 Errol Morris, The Most Curious Thing, NYTIMES.COM (May 19, 2008 10:56 PM),
http://opinionator.blogs.nytimes.com/2008/05/19/the-most-curious-thing/;
see
also
EKMAN, EMOTIONS REVEALED, supra note 45, at 204-12.
50 EKMAN, EMOTIONS REVEALED, supra note 45, at 2-14.
51 Id.
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Babies smile when they are happy, not because they have learned
to smile from watching their parents, but because they have
instinctive physiological responses.52 Second, people’s emotions
are revealed on their faces via involuntary muscular contractions,
and these facial expressions occur precognitively, before the
individual becomes consciously aware that they are experiencing
the emotion.53 Once the individual is aware that they are
experiencing the emotion, they can regain control of their facial
expressions,54 hence the term “fleeting expression.” There are
some limits to this. People can artificially limit their facial
expressions in advance by adopting a “poker face.” While it is hard
to mask genuine emotions, it is also difficult to voluntarily mimic
genuine facial expressions of emotion.55 It is hard for most people
to voluntarily contract a subset of the facial muscles that are
naturally involved in genuine expressions.56 Because autonomic
systems control those responses, a smile that comes from genuine
emotion is in fact different in appearance from a forced smile. 57
Perhaps less intuitive is a third claim: with training, most
people can see and identify the fleeting expressions, and can
detect and articulate the difference between genuine and forced
expressions.58 Some people—those with strong intuitive skills—
are very good at this naturally, although they usually lack the
capacity and the vocabulary to explain what it is they were
doing. 59
The science has a long intellectual history, starting with the
work of Wallace Friesen, 60 and being largely systematized by Paul
Ekman, a psychologist and professor who created the Facial
This theory dates back to Darwin’s observations of blind children.
EKMAN, TELLING LIES, supra note 45, at 123-26.
54 Id. at 131.
55 Id. at 132-33.
56 Id.
57 Id. at 158-60.
58 See Paul Ekman et al., A Few Can Catch A Liar, 10 PSYCHOL. SCI. 263, 263-65
(1999) (finding that seventy-three percent of federal intelligence and law enforcement
officers, sixty-seven percent of Los Angeles County sheriffs, and sixty-two percent of
federal judges could detect a lie after completing training in facial recognition
methods).
59 Id.
60 Paul Ekman & Wallace V. Friesen, Nonverbal Leakage and Clues to Deception,
32 PSYCHIATRY 88 (1969).
52
53
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Action Coding System (“FACS”) for documenting the component
changes in facial expression. 61 Ekman’s work was popularized in
science writer Malcolm Gladwell’s 2005 bestseller, Blink: The
Power of Thinking Without Thinking.62 Ekman and some of his
successors have adapted the methodology and now offer training
in this science to law enforcement. 63
In Blink, Malcolm Gladwell offered a tantalizing glimpse of
the potential use of the science of facial expression in the
courtroom when he interviewed Ekman. Ekman chose, as one
example of his system, videotaped testimony from the murder
trial of former University of Southern California and Buffalo Bills
running back O.J. Simpson. 64 He dissected the testimony of Brian
“Kato” Kaelin, an actor who rented Simpson’s pool house and saw
O.J. Simpson the night that his ex-wife Nicole Brown Simpson
and Beverly Hills waiter Ronald Goldman were murdered. 65
Kaelin’s testimony regarding Simpson’s whereabouts that night
and Simpson’s demeanor when he encountered Kaelin shortly
after the murders was important to the case. As Gladwell explains
the exercise:
Ekman slipped a tape taken from the O.J. Simpson trial
into the VCR. It was of Kato Kaelin, Simpson’s shaggyhaired house guest, being examined by Marcia Clark, one
of the prosecutors in the case. Kaelin sits in the witness
box, with his trademark vacant look. Clark asks a hostile
question. Kaelin leans forward and answers softly. “Did
you see that?” Ekman asked me. I saw nothing, just Kato
being Kato—harmless and passive. Ekman stopped the
EKMAN & FRIESEN, supra note 47.
MALCOLM GLADWELL, BLINK: THE POWER OF THINKING WITHOUT THINKING 197214 (2005).
63 According to Ekman’s website, he “frequently advises police departments, antiterrorism groups, and animation studios.” See See The Truth Behind the Lies: Evening
Seminar, SMITHSONIAN RESIDENT ASSOCIATES PROGRAM, http://residentassociates.org/
ticketing/tickets/reserve.aspx?performanceNumber=219398 (last visited Nov. 1, 2010).
Customs officials report that after receiving training from Ekman their “hit rate” for
finding drugs during passenger searches increased to 22.5 percent from 4.2 percent in
1998. Bob Burns, The Truth Behind the Title: Behavior Detection Officer, THE TSA
BLOG (Feb. 29, 2008 4:12 PM), http://blog.tsa.gov/2008/02/truth-behind-title-behaviordetection.html.
64 GLADWELL, supra note 62, at 211.
65 Id.
61
62
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tape, rewound it, and played it back in slow motion. On the
screen, Kaelin moved forward to answer the question, and
in that fraction of a second his face was utterly
transformed. His nose wrinkled, as he flexed his levator
labii superioris, alaeque nasi. His teeth were bared, his
brows lowered. “It was almost totally A.U. nine,” Ekman
said. “It’s disgust, with anger there as well, and the clue to
that is that when your eyebrows go down, typically your
eyes are not as open as they are here. The raised upper
eyelid is a component of anger, not disgust. It’s very quick.”
Ekman stopped the tape and played it again, peering at
the screen. “You know, he looks like a snarling dog.”
Ekman said that there was nothing magical about his
ability to pick up an emotion that fleeting. It was simply a
matter of practice. “I could show you forty examples, and
you could pick it up. I have a training tape, and people love
it. They start it, and they can’t see any of these
expressions. Thirty-five minutes later, they can see them
all. What that says is that this is an accessible skill.” 66
And some police are now training to access that skill. As they do
so, their reliance on it, and their testimony about it will become
crucial.67

C. A Common Fact Pattern
Ekman’s work may be giving new answers to old questions:
How do good cops explain what they are doing and why they are
doing it to those of us who have never been there? How is
expertise in criminal behavior and the patterns of street conduct
translated into language accessible by the courts? To help work
through the practical implications, consider the following fact
pattern: Imagine for a moment a police officer passing an
Id.
It also may lead to more searching than civil libertarians might be comfortable
with, if it ever became a permissible sole basis for a Terry stop. And it has the potential
to make already bad situations even worse, if we widely accept these new techniques,
and give bad cops something new, and fundamentally unfalsifiable, to say in court. For
the bad cops, it may make very little difference because they will lie to meet the legal
standard no matter what it is. However, it may give them something to say when
cameras capture many aspects of a situation but miss the suspect’s face.
66
67

952

MISSISSIPPI LAW JOURNAL

[VOL. 81:5

individual on a crowded street late one summer night, in a bar
district he regularly patrols on foot. Something about the
individual he just passed strikes a chord in him somewhere, but
he is not sure why. His instincts, honed by years on the street,
ring an alarm bell and are screaming danger. He cannot articulate
a reason. The man is dressed normally, although he is wearing a
loose jacket with a bulge under his arm. His clothing is out of
place for the area, which is a nightclub district, and the weather is
warm. He is walking oddly, but that is not enough to have set off
the officer’s instincts. His face was wrong, but he can’t explain
what about it made him react. The man clearly appears to be
looking for someone. He watches the man’s back a little while
longer. He imagines having to explain to his sergeant and to the
courts later why he stopped the man and decides that he does not
have enough information to explain why he made a stop, so he
proceeds on his way. Twenty minutes later, the man shoots and
kills his estranged wife. Did this officer do the right thing?
Now re-imagine the same scenario. At the moment the alarm
bells are triggered in his head, the police officer reacts to his
instinct and stops the man. He attempts to ask him questions, but
the man says “If you’re arresting me, arrest me, if you’re not, leave
me alone. I know my rights.” After this very brief conversation,
the officer cannot shake the feeling that the man is dangerous.
The bulge that he noticed in the man’s jacket is too indistinct for
him to say what is in it. Although he cannot say why, he is
convinced the man is dangerous. He tells the man to put his hands
on top of his head, leans him against the wall, and frisks him. It
turns out he is carrying a concealed weapon—a handgun, in a
shoulder holster. The officer takes the man’s gun, handcuffs him,
and takes his wallet out of his pocket to identify him. He radios
the station for information on the man, based on the ID he finds in
his wallet. It turns out that the man is a convicted felon with a
history of spousal battery who is under a current domestic
violence restraining order. Further investigation reveals that his
estranged wife was out with a date at a nightclub three blocks
from the location where the man was stopped. In this jurisdiction,
it is a crime to carry a concealed weapon while subject to a
domestic violence restraining order, so the officer arrests the man.
Did this officer do the right thing? What he did was
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unconstitutional under current doctrine, and the handgun would
almost certainly be suppressed as the fruit of the poisonous tree.
Let us imagine the same scenario again. This time, the officer
finds a flashlight in the man’s coat pocket, not a concealed
weapon. The officer takes the man’s ID as before, writes down his
name, apologizes for the inconvenience, and leaves.68 Did this
officer do the right thing?
Now let us once again imagine this scenario differently, in a
world where police have extensive training in behavioral
observation and a new technique—precognitive facial expression
analysis, a form of applied cognitive psychology. Now, when he is
asked about what he saw, the officer says that when he looked
into the man’s face as he was approaching him on the street, he
saw a series of microexpressions or “emblematic slips.” These
microexpressions included anger and disgust as the man looked at
women passing him on the street and mingled fear and disgust
when he saw the police officer. 69 The officer explains how he was
able to do so, based on his training in precognitive facial
expression. The officer explains that he has been trained that
there are fleeting facial expressions that appear in response to
environmental stimuli, and that these expressions occur
precognitively, before the individual is aware of them and
consciously asserts control over his facial muscles. Because they
are instinctive and precognitive, they are very effective indicators
of a person’s genuine emotion. In addition, the man’s behavior was
consistent with hunting for someone, not simply strolling down
the street. He was rapidly scanning the crowd, checking faces,
dismissing them, and continuing down the street. He appeared to
be hyper-alert, in an area where most people were relaxed and

Cf. Bennett Capers, Policing, Race, and Place, 44 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 43, 63
(2009) (noting that only one out of ten individuals stopped and frisked by the New York
Police Department in 2006 were arrested or served summons); Christopher Slobogin,
Why Liberals Should Chuck the Exclusionary Rule, 1999 U. ILL. L. REV. 363, 374 n.34
(1999) (noting that only one out of one-hundred people stopped by New Orleans police
officers in the late 1960s were prosecuted).
69 Of course, people may fear or distrust the police for many reasons. See, e.g.,
Lenese Herbert, Othello Error: Facial Profiling, Privacy, and the Suppression of
Dissent, 5 OHIO ST. J. CRIM. L. 79 (2007); Andrew E. Taslitz, Police Are People Too:
Cognitive Obstacles to, and Opportunities for, Police Getting the Individualized
Suspicion Judgment Right, 8 OHIO ST. J. CRIM. L. 7, 10-12.
68
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having a good time. The officer stops and frisks the suspect based
on these criteria.
Is this enough to change the balance? That will depend in
part on the interaction between the legal standard—”reasonable
and articulable suspicion” and judicial consumption of the police
officer’s training in the new methods. Social scientists who study
human expression and emotion have created the language that
will permit translation of police experience into words. We can
expect a shift from cop-speak terms like “there was something
‘hinky’ 70 about the guy” (a statement which in this author’s
experience has drawn nods from experienced law enforcement
officers across the country but will draw frowns from judges) to
“his precognitive affect was inconsistent with his surroundings.”
This statement is scientifically sound, almost impossible to falsify,
will include embedded value judgments about what human
emotions should be showing on a person’s face in a given context,
and may lead to more searching than we are comfortable with if it
becomes a permissible sole basis for a Terry stop.

D. The Nose of the Camel—TSA Adopts SPOT
The use of the science of precognitive facial expression in law
enforcement is no hypothetical—it has arrived. If someone has
flown into a major airport in the United States in the last three
years, odds are that it has been applied to them or their traveling
companions. 71 Screeners for the Transportation Safety Authority
(TSA) have been applying behavioral observation techniques
based on this science under the acronym SPOT (Screening
Passengers by Observation Technique). 72 The techniques are
based on behavior, so in theory they avoid the potential for bias
See Hinky Definition, URBANDICTIONARY.COM, http://www.urbandictionary.com/
define.php?term=hinky (visited Nov. 1, 2010) (defining hinky as 1) “Something as yet
undefinable is wrong, out of place; not quite right. There’s something hinky about the
deal[,]” or 2) “A cop’s version of “I’ve a bad feeling about that.”).
71 See Behavior Detection Officers (BDO): Layers of Security, TRANSP. SEC. ADMIN.,
http://www.tsa.gov/what_we_do/layers/bdo/index.shtm (last visited Nov. 1, 2011)
(noting that behavior detection officers (BDOs) currently are deployed at 161 airports
in the United States).
72 See BDOs SPOT More Than Just Opportunities at TSA: News & Happenings,
TRANSP. SEC. ADMIN., (May 8, 2007), http://www.tsa.gov/press/happenings/
boston_bdo_spot.shtm.
70
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that existed in profiles based on immutable characteristics. 73
Whether the immutable characteristics may be used more subtly,
for example in selecting whom to observe in the first instance, is
an open question.
Kip Hawley, the Assistant Secretary of Homeland Security
described the techniques as follows:
We use a system of behavior observation that is based on
the science that demonstrates that there are certain
involuntary, subconscious actions that can betray a
person’s hostile intent. For instance, there are tiny—but
noticeable to the trained person—movements in a person’s
facial muscles when they have certain emotions. It is very
different from the stress we all show when we’re anxious
about missing the flight due to, say, a long security line.
This is true across race, gender, age, ethnicity, etc. It is our
way of not falling into the trap where we predict what a
terrorist is going to look like. We know they use people
who “look like” terrorists, but they also use people who do
not, perhaps thinking that we cue only off of what the 9/11
hijackers looked like.
Our Behavior Detection teams routinely—and quietly—
identify problem people just through observable behavior
cues. More than 150 people have been identified by our
teams, turned over to law enforcement, and subsequently
arrested. This layer is invisible to the public, but don’t
73 In testimony before Congress, Assistant TSA Secretary Kip Hawley described it
this way:

We have deployed hundreds of BDOs at the 40 busiest airports as part of the
Screening Passengers by Observation Technique (SPOT) program. The SPOT
program uses nonintrusive behavior observation and analysis techniques to
identify potentially high-risk passengers based solely on their exhibited
behavior. BDOs are trained to detect individuals exhibiting behaviors that
indicate they may be a threat. The program is a derivative of other successful
behavioral analysis programs that have been employed by law enforcement
and security personnel both in the U.S. and around the world.
See Kip Hawley, Assistant Sec’y, Transp. Sec. Admin., Statement Before the United
States House of Representatives Committee on Transportation and Infrastructure
Subcommittee on Aviation (July 24, 2008), available at http://www.tsa.gov/
press/speeches/072408_hawley_aviation_security.shtm. Some critics are convinced that
even behavior-based programs will lead to discrimination against minorities. See
generally Herbert, supra note 69.
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discount it, because it may be the most effective. We
publicize non-terrorist-related successes like a murder
suspect caught in Minneapolis and a bank robber caught in
Philadelphia.
Most common are people showing phony documents, but
we have even picked out undercover operatives—including
our own. One individual, identified by a TSO in late May
and not allowed to fly, was killed in a police shoot-out five
days later. Additionally, several individuals have been of
interest from the counter-terrorism perspective. With just
this limited deployment of Behavior Detection Officers
(BDOs),
we
have
identified
more
people
of
counterterrorism interest than all the people combined
caught with prohibited items. Look for us to continue to
look at ways that highlight problem people rather than
just problem objects.74
TSA is not alone. The techniques adopted by the agency are
based on the experiences of other law enforcement agencies.75 As
the agencies and agents talk to each other, the science of facial
expression will inevitably work its way into the courtroom.
Collectively, society will have to answer some new questions:
What weight should courts give to the new training in the context
of reasonable and articulable suspicion? How do we as society
want police to react under the circumstances outlined above?
What are the risks to permitting the police to rely on this newly
articulated way of explaining their “street sense”? What are the
risks if we fail to do so?

III. SOME HIDDEN FLAWS OF THE TERRY PARADIGM
Psychological research suggests some additional problems
that are inherent in the current paradigm. First, psychologists
who study the nature of expert decision-making suggest that
police officers may not be fully aware of much of the information

Interview by Bruce Schneier with Kip Hawley, Assistant Sec’y, Transp. Sec.
Admin. (July 30, 2007), available at http://www.schneier.com/interview-hawley.html.
75 See Burns, supra note 63 (noting that Ekman had previously worked with
Customs and Border Protection, the Central Intelligence Agency, the Federal Bureau of
Investigation, and other government agencies).
74
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on which they rely at the time they are using it. 76 Second,
research into the nature of memory itself suggests that by
requiring officers to write reports and prepare testimony to match
a particular standard, the system may be irrevocably tampering
with the officers’ memory. 77 I consider each of these claims in
turn.

A. Naturalistic Decision Making
At least some of the dissatisfaction with the Terry standard
on the law enforcement side is based on a fundamental mismatch
between the way emergency responders, such as police officers,
and lawyers think. It seems unlikely the Terry standard
adequately reflects the reality of the practice of experienced police
officers. Research into the way experts perform their jobs in other
disciplines that require rapid reaction to changing circumstances
in a stress-filled environment—firefighters, military officers, and
jet pilots—has shown that decisions like these are not the product
of the type of analysis in which judges and lawyers routinely
engage.78 Simply put, the officer on the street is engaged in a
different kind of thinking than a judge on the bench.
Naturalistic Decision Making (NDM) is the term for a new
field of applied psychological research. NDM “seeks explicitly to
understand how people handle complex tasks and environments.
Instead of trying to reduce these to variables that can be studied
at leisure, NDM examines the phenomena themselves in the
context of the situations where they are found . . . .” 79
76 Anthony J. Pinizzotto et al., Intuitive Policing: Emotional/Rational DecisionMaking in Law Enforcement, 73 FBI L. ENFORCEMENT BULL., 1, 2-3 (Feb. 2004).
77 Cf. Bennett L. Gershman, Witness Coaching by Prosecutors, 23 CARDOZO L. REV.
829, 839 (2002) (“Whereas witness preparation certainly can assist a witness in
remembering and retrieving a truthful recollection, preparation can also distort a
witness’s underlying memory and produce a false recollection.”).
78 See Gary Klein et al., Rapid Decision-Making on the Fire Ground: The Original
Study Plus a Postscript, in PROCEEDINGS OF THE HUMAN FACTORS SOCIETY 30TH
ANNUAL MEETING 576 (1986) (firefighters); George L. Kaempf et al., Decision-Making
in Complex Naval Command-and-Control Environments, 38 HUMAN FACTORS 220
(1996) (naval officers); PETER A. SIMPSON, NATURALISTIC DECISION MAKING IN
AVIATION ENVIRONMENTS (2001), available at http://dspace.dsto.defence.gov.au/dspace/
bitstream/1947/3813/1/DSTO-GD-0279%20PR.pdf (jet pilots).
79 Eduardo Salas and Gary Klein, Expertise and Naturalistic Decision Making: An
Overview, in LINKING EXPERTISE AND NATURALISTIC DECISION MAKING 3 (2001).
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Decision researchers such as Gary Klein, Roberta
Calderwood, and Anne Clinton-Cirocco call the process that
experts acting in these stressful conditions engage in “recognitionprimed decisionmaking.” 80 In these situations, experts do not
carefully choose among a series of generated alternatives. Instead,
they rapidly pattern match, looking for an experience that fits the
situation. 81 We may be missing the big picture altogether by
requiring explicit knowledge as the basis for a constitutional stop.
According to Klein:
Many researchers are now advocating for a dual-system
mode of thinking. The automatic system is fast, automatic,
effortless and emotional, and uses tacit knowledge. The
reflective system is slower, conscious, effortful, deliberate,
logical and serial, and uses explicit knowledge. These two
systems, which work in different ways, complement each
other . . . .” 82
And these two systems do not easily connect to each other. 83 It is
not hard to imagine that they also reflect the difference between
the systems that take precedence for a police officer on the street,
deciding whether he or the public is at risk, and for a prosecutor
or judge in the office trying to decide whether that decision meets
the Terry standard.
Return to the hypothetical officer observing the suspect on
the street. Imagine that instead of the officer observing
everything, a camera worn by the officer records it. The same
information that was available to the camera is now available to
his supervisor, the prosecutor, the judge, and ultimately the jury.
Ironically, much of the information that they will be processing
may not be available to the officer, at least not consciously. While
he is on the street, in the danger zone, if his instincts suggest
something is wrong, and that the suspect may be dangerous, his
focus may change. Instead of closely watching the suspect’s face,
at least consciously, his focus may change to the suspect’s hands
Klein, supra note 78.
Id.
82 GARY KLEIN, STREETLIGHTS AND SHADOWS: SEARCHING FOR THE KEYS TO
ADAPTIVE DECISION MAKING 93 (2009).
83 Id.
80
81
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and to the clothing where weapons may be hidden. His
subconscious mind may be processing all of the details that we are
watching on camera, but his attention is focused down on only a
few things. This attention limitation may mean that, at times, the
officer will have less accessible to him than we might expect when
he is called upon to testify in court about the basis of his actions.84

B. Constructed Memory and Verbal Overshadowing: Going
From That’s How It Must Have Happened to That’s How It Did
Happen
Constructed memory is one of the concerns that attorneys
must grapple with for all witnesses. 85 Memory is not a fixed point,
and it is constructed, and reconstructed, from the moment of the
event to the moment of recall on the witness stand. Many readers
of this Article have a memory of themselves involved in some
significant event—a birthday party, Christmas, a wedding—where
they can see themselves engaged in the activity in their mind’s
eye. This third-person view of the event is both real and an
artifact. Barring an out-of-body experience, it is unlikely that the
person with such a memory truly saw themselves that way. The
image may well come from a photograph, or a video, or some other
reconstruction based on family stories, fragmentary memories,
and the rest of the memory is filled in around it. It may contain
many important and accurate details, such as who was present,
what was received, how one felt, but the image has become part of
the memory in such a way that it is intertwined in one’s mind. 86
Advances in memory research show that there are multiple
paths in which a witness can develop a real but false memory. 87
Factors such as stress and gap-filling can affect the acquisition of

84 See infra notes 113-19 and accompanying text for a discussion of replacing the
hypothetical camera with a real one.
85 See Gary L. Wells & Elizabeth F. Loftus, Eyewitness Memory for People and
Events, in 11 HANDBOOK OF PSYCHOLOGY: FORENSIC PSYCHOLOGY 149, 150 (Alan M.
Goldstein ed., 2003).
86 See Elizabeth F. Loftus, Memory Faults and Fixes, 18 ISSUES IN SCI. & TECH. 42
(2002).
87 FREDERICK CHARLES BARTLETT, REMEMBERING: A STUDY IN EXPERIMENTAL AND
SOCIAL PSYCHOLOGY (Cambridge Univ. Press 1997); ELIZABETH LOFTUS & KATHERINE
KETCHAM, THE MYTH OF REPRESSED MEMORY (1994).
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information. 88 Stress and the post-event misinformation effect can
also alter memories after they have been initially encoded, and
memories can be significantly affected by the passage of time.89
“People integrate new materials into their memory,
modifying what they believe they personally experienced. When
people combine information gathered at the time of an actual
experience with information acquired later, they form a smooth
and seamless memory and thereafter have great difficulty telling
which facts came from which time.” 90
It gets worse. Post-event suggestion, which may include new
information from other witnesses, photos, records, reports, or even
leading questions, often does more than refresh and bolster a
fading memory.91 It can create entirely new, and entirely false,
memories.92 Many of the criticisms of hypnotically induced
memory, for example, are based on this phenomenon. 93 Memory
researchers have been able to successfully implant genuinely
believed but entirely false memories, demonstrating clinically that
this phenomenon exists. 94
Wells & Loftus, supra note 85, at 150.
Id.
90 Loftus, supra note 86, at 43. Legal scholars have considered the dangers in the
context of all witness preparation. See also Mirjan Damaska, Presentation of Evidence
and Factfinding Precision, 123 U. PA. L. REV. 1083, 1094 (1975) (“During the sessions
devoted to “coaching,” the future witness is likely to try to adapt himself to
expectations mirrored in the interviewer’s one-sided attitude. As a consequence, gaps
in his memory may even unconsciously be filled out by what he thinks accords with the
lawyer’s expectations and are in tune with his thesis. Later, in court, these additions to
memory images may appear to the witness himself as accurate reproductions of his
original perceptions.”).
91 Loftus, supra note 86, at 43.
92 Id.
93 See, e.g., Amanda J. Barnier & Kevin M. McConkey, Reports of Real and False
Memories: The Relevance of Hypnosis, Hypnotizability, and Context of Memory Test,
101 J. ABNORMAL PSYCHOL. 521, 521-27 (1992) (comparing studies of the factors
affecting false memory, including hypnosis).
94 D.S. Lindsay et al., True Photographs and False Memories, 15 PSYCHOL. SCI. 149
(2004) (discussing implanted false memories of being hospitalized overnight for an ear
infection, spilling a punch bowl on the bride’s parents at a wedding, getting one’s hand
caught in a mousetrap, hiding the toy slime in the teacher’s desk, and witnessing a
demonic possession); Elizabeth Loftus & Jacqueline Pickrell, The Formation of False
Memories, 25 PSYCHIATRIC ANNALS 720, 720-21 (1995) (experimentally implanting false
memories of being lost in a shopping mall as a young child); Giuliana Mazzoni &
Amina Memon, Imagination Can Create False Autobiographical Memories, 14
PSYCHOL. SCI. 186 (2003).
88
89
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Moreover, witness confidence in the quality of the memory
can increase as the officer prepares for trial, even as the
contamination increases. 95 According to experimental research
done to test the effects that witness preparation had on witness
confidence:
Postevent questioning led to significantly higher later
confidence ratings for incorrect responses in all three
experiments, as well as for correct responses in one of the
experiments. This finding is consistent with some
anecdotal evidence from the legal arena that eyewitnesses
often become more confident in their memories of a
criminal episode as the time for testimony at trial draws
near (and as the accumulated amount of postevent
questioning increases). 96
This matters in the Terry context because honest officers trying to
recall what happened are just as likely as other witnesses to
experience all of these memory-altering effects. And because they
may have been involved in hundreds of similar situations by the
time they testify in court, the details of one may be blurring into
another. As repeat players, officers may be more, not less,
susceptible to the creation of false memories. 97 An officer who has
made fifty additional traffic stops in the same stretch of highway
or has had fifty citizen encounters in the same area of his beat
between the time he encountered a particular defendant and the
time he testifies, may be unable to keep the details from blending.
As the following section explains, asking him to reduce the
experience to a written report, one that focuses on legally relevant
95 See Steven Penrod & Brian Cutler, Witness Confidence and Witness Accuracy:
Assessing Their Forensic Relation, 1 PSYCHOL. PUB. POL’Y & L. 817, 822 (1995) (noting
that studies indicate that “confidence in one’s ability to make a correct identification is
a poor predictor of identification accuracy”).
96 John S. Shaw III & Kimberley A. McClure, Repeated Postevent Questioning Can
Lead to Elevated Levels of Eyewitness Confidence, 20 LAW & HUM. BEHAV. 629 (1996).
97 It is possible, of course, for police officers to lie, and for judges to fail to critically
examine their testimony. See, e.g., Laurie L. Levenson, Unnerving the Judges: Judicial
Responsibility for the Rampart Scandal, 34 LOY. L.A. L. REV. 787, 790-91 (2001)
(asserting that judges sometimes “ignor[e] telltale signs that police officers fabricate
testimony to obtain convictions. . . . include[ing] amazingly similar stories by officers
regarding the conduct of unrelated defendants, inconsistencies in police officer reports,
[and] dramatic recalls of memory . . . .”) (alteration in original).
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facts, may preserve information, but may also have the additional
effect of changing the way his memory works altogether.98
The courts’ preference for articulable experiences, and the
practical support systems that come with that in the form of
written reports, may actually be altering the memories of officers
and witnesses over multiple stages. Translating a largely
subconscious experience into Terry terms requires officers to go
from recall of the event as a set of subjective experiences—sights,
sounds, smells—to a set of verbalized experiences. By requiring
officers to translate their conduct into articulable suspicion to
meet the standard, we may have the unintended effect of
reprogramming their memories of the event so that the standard
we ask them to articulate actually alters the memory of the event
to conform with the criteria.
In particular, the research of psychiatrist Jonathan Schooler
has shown that using words to describe memories can interfere
with recall of faces or images. 99 His work shows that recall favors
the verbal description, however inaccurate it may have been
initially, once the subject has committed to it. 100 Verbal memory
operates through a different area of the brain than visual
memory. 101 Schooler’s work has shown that committing to a verbal
description actually changes the part of the brain that is accessed
when recalling the event.102

98 Tanja Rapus Benton et al., Eyewitness Memory Is Still Not Common Sense:
Comparing Jurors, Judges and Law Enforcement to Eyewitness Experts, 20 APPLIED
COGNITIVE PSYCHOL. 115 (2006); Richard A. Wise & Martin A. Safer, What U.S. Judges
Know and Believe About Eyewitness Testimony, 18 APPLIED COGNITIVE PSYCHOL. 427
(2004); see also C. A. Elizabeth Luuss & Gary Wells, The Malleability of Eyewitness
Confidence: Co-Witness and Perseverance Effects, 79 J. APPLIED PSYCHOL. 714 (1994);
John S. Shaw, Increases in Eyewitness Confidence Resulting from Postevent
Questioning, 2 J. EXPERIMENTAL PSYCHOL.: APPLIED 126-46 (1996).
99 See
Jonathan W. Schooler and Tonya Y. Engstler-Schooler, Verbal
Overshadowing of Visual Memories: Some Things are Better Left Unsaid, 22 COGNITIVE
PSYCHOL. 36 (1990).
100 Id. at 37-38.
101 See Jonathan W. Schooler, Verbalization Produces a Transfer Inappropriate
Processing Shift, APPLIED COGNITIVE PSYCHOL. 989, 992 (2002).
102 Id.
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IV. WHAT POLICY IMPLICATIONS SHOULD WE DRAW FROM
THESE INSIGHTS?
Requiring “articulable suspicion” rather than an “inchoate
hunch” may seem perfectly sensible to lawyers and judges—after
all articulating is what they do. 103 Do the courts mean that the
articulation should arise before the officer acts? The answer is
clearly no, although that would be the time most likely to regulate
police conduct. The courts have decided that the inquiry is
objective, not subjective, and that while the information must
have been available to the officer at the time of the event, it need
not have been processed by the particular officer as such. The
question is not what this particular officer thought at the time.
Rather, it is what a reasonable police officer using the information
available at the time might have done.
This objective approach leads to a host of concerns about the
process of translating an experience in the field into testimony.
For example, when and how does the officer learn and formulate
the information? Can a sergeant or a supervisor help the officer to
prepare? Can departments create and use question-driven report
processing that drives the officer toward meeting the legal
standard? Is this simply careful capturing of information, or does
framing the report to meet the anticipated constitutional
objections amount to impermissible witness coaching? Is it okay
for the articulation to be the result of a searching inquiry by the
prosecutor before the officer takes the stand? Can a prosecutor
explain the rules and ask the officer to reframe his observations in
a format recognizable to the courts? And how much will the
process of meeting the Terry standard contaminate the officer’s
memory of the experience itself? Scholars such as Christopher
Slobogin have written extensively on whether current Fourth
Amendment doctrine and the exclusionary rule create incentives
for officers to lie. 104 But lying, in the latter context, means that
the officer is testifying in deliberate disregard for the truth; the
103 See Lerner, supra note 40, at 29-31 (arguing that courts privilege articulate
explanations over mere hunches, often to the detriment of the search for truth).
104 Some critics suggest that the officer is “testilying” when they alter their
statements to conform with the requirements of reasonable suspicion or probable
cause. Christopher Slobogin, Testilying: Police Perjury and What to Do About It, 67 U.
COLO. L. REV. 1037, 1043 (1996).
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officer has a true memory of the event, which he then disregards
while testifying, in favor of a false account that will permit the
officer to meet the constitutional standard.
The contaminating effects of preparing to testify can also
have a truth-distorting effect, even for honest officers and
prosecutors. We should ask applied cognitive psychologists to
study whether current Fourth Amendment doctrine and the
mechanisms we have created to enforce it are causing officers to
give subjectively true testimony regarding their encounters, i.e.,
statements that reflect their memory as they perceive it, but that
have been altered by the process of capturing and accessing the
information in constitutional terms. Specifically, the existing
research begs us to consider how much the inquiry that
prosecutors go through when preparing the witness, or even a
witness’s anticipation of the line of questioning, alters the way the
police officer remembers the event. 105 Given that words and
experiences often reside in different parts of the brain itself, does
the process of writing a police report fundamentally alter the
nature of the memory itself? Is a form that directs thinking down
certain paths, or training that directs officers to remember things
in certain, court-approved ways, changing the nature of the
experience itself? Given that memory is constructed, does the way
we apply the standard help or hurt the courts in their quest for
accuracy? 106
Once we have some answers from the applied psychologists,
attorneys and the courts have a related set of questions to
105 For a review of the risks, see generally Fred C. Zacharias & Shaun Martin,
Coaching Witnesses, 87 KY. L.J. 1001 (1999); Joseph D. Piorkowski, Jr., Professional
Conduct and the Preparation of Witnesses for Trial: Defining the Acceptable Limitations
of ‘Coaching,’ 1 GEO. J. LEGAL ETHICS 389 (1988); and Gershman, supra note 77.
106 While this Article is focused on the Terry inquiries, the same questions apply to
preparation based on the elements of an offense. If one spends enough time in traffic
court, one will hear the almost liturgical repetition of the factors that led an officer to
administer a breathalyzer or equivalent blood alcohol test. It goes something like this:
“I approached the vehicle and examined the subject. There was a strong odor of alcohol.
The subject’s eyes were glassy and bloodshot. His speech was slurred and his response
to questions was delayed, and he appeared confused. Based on these preliminary
indicators, I chose to administer a field sobriety test, (and a field test for blood alcohol
if appropriate in the jurisdiction), and then placed the subject under arrest, before
transporting him to the station for the administration of a BAC test under controlled
conditions.” I have personally seen officers give this speech, or a very close variant of it,
on more than a dozen occasions over the course of a single day in traffic court.
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examine. How does the administrative decision to adopt these
methods and train law enforcement to deploy them factor into
Fourth Amendment reasonableness? Is there some deference due
to the executive branch in this area? 107 How sure do the courts
have to be that the officer was wrong to suppress? How should the
burdens be allocated—legally and in reality? Are there
technological solutions that can help us sort through these
problems?
Other observers of the Terry regime are comforted by the idea
that even inefficient and dysfunctional judicial oversight is better
than no oversight. Some have gone so far as to label Terry a
“practically perfect” doctrine. 108 How much comfort should we
take if the costs are fully on the table? Has the Court stunted the
development of alternative methods of policing the police by
creating a false sense that there is someone watching the
watchers? 109

A. Enforcement of the Standard
Courts enforce the Fourth Amendment through the
exclusionary rule. And they have chosen to do so through a
standard that reflects the courtroom’s inherent bias in language
skill. But while the courts will suppress evidence, they are loath to
find an officer to have deliberately lied. It does evoke the question:
How do we tell the honest but inarticulate officer from the corrupt
officer? One way to interpret the deference that underlies many of
the opinions and practices is that the courts have a sense that
most police officers are doing a trying and dangerous job, that it is
experiential, and that it may be hard to translate those
experiences into words. And the courts assume that most of the
time the officers are acting in good faith. It seems at least possible
that the reluctance to punish police officers for Fourth
Amendment violations stems in part from a tacit realization that
there are genuine but inarticulable experiences that at least some
of these police officers have relied upon to conduct what would
otherwise appear to be violative stops. That is, good cops, with
107 For a discussion of the deference courts show to police, see Becton, supra note 41,
at 470-71.
108 See Saltzburg, supra note 4.
109 Levenson, supra note 97, at 790-91.
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good street sense, have been bad at explaining why they were
doing what they were doing. 110 Judges implicitly recognize the
memory contamination effects and the differential language skills
of officers when they find an officer has testified incorrectly but
not falsely.
This reluctance to find that officers have lied may lead to
inaction even in cases where action is warranted. In her postmortem of the Rampart scandal in Los Angeles, where corrupt
police officers were framing innocent individuals, and falsifying
testimony about others, Professor Laurie Levenson noted that
even conscientious judges who find an officer’s testimony to be
false in a particular case are unlikely to go beyond that. 111 As she
put it:
There has been a failure by judges who have witnessed
police perjury to take meaningful action to prevent such
misconduct in the future. A judge’s standard course of
action when an officer has lied is to dismiss the case or
grant a motion to suppress, and ask the prosecutors to
report the misconduct to appropriate police internal affairs
authorities. There is no follow-up by the court, no judicial
reporting of the misconduct, no contempt orders, and no
tracking of the problem officers. As a result, while a judge
may occasionally take an interest in a particular case,
systemic problems with corrupt police officers continue. 112

110 The problem I am discussing is different from the problem addressed by scholars
such as Christopher Slobogin, who suggests that current Fourth Amendment doctrine
and the exclusionary rule create incentives for officers to lie, and Melanie Wilson, who
is seeking ways to empirically test this proposition. See Slobogin, supra note 104, at
1041-48 (discussing the issue of false police testimony and indications that it occurs);
see also David N. Dorfman, Proving the Lie: Litigating Police Credibility, 26 AM. J.
CRIM. L. 455, 470-71 (1999) (noting that judicial opinions impugning the motives,
honesty, or competency of police are rare); Stanley Z. Fisher, “Just the Facts, Ma’am”:
Lying and the Omission of Exculpatory Evidence in Police Reports, 28 NEW ENG. L.
REV. 1, 36-38 (1993) (discussing police access to exculpatory evidence and its absence
from their reports.); Melanie D. Wilson, Judging Police LiesAn Empirical Perspective
(Jan. 2010) (unpublished manuscript), available at http://works.bepress.com/cgi/
viewcontent.cgi?article=1002&context=melanie_wilson.
111 Levenson, supra note 97, at 194.
112 Id.
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VI. CAMERAS AS A SOLUTION
As detailed above, current Fourth Amendment doctrine may
actually encourage practices that restructure an honest officer’s
memory in unappreciated ways. Officers are witnesses, and are
susceptible to the same faults of memory that apply to all
eyewitnesses, including the raft of problems associated with
constructed memory. Because memory is constructed, the
searching inquiry that attorneys engage in when preparing or
cross-examining the witness may alter irreparably the way the
police officer remembers the event. Given that words and
experiences often reside in different parts of the brain itself, the
process of writing a police report tailored to meet Fourth
Amendment demands may likewise fundamentally alter the
nature of the memory itself. Report forms that direct an officer’s
thinking down certain paths, or training that directs officers to
remember things in certain, court-approved ways, may change the
nature of the experience itself because officers have their
attention directed and constrained.
Given these dangers, a new approach is warranted.
Reasonable and articulable suspicion, the traditional Terry
standard, should be reframed more broadly, as reasonable
suspicion supported by credible evidence. Articulable suspicion is
only a subset of a larger category, based on the reasonableness
more generally. The important issue is whether the courts are
able to meaningfully engage in oversight of the police and remain
capable of protecting the citizenry’s Fourth Amendment rights.
The courts should be able to make that determination based on
any available evidence. Oral testimony is only one way to make
the officer’s action amenable to judicial review, which is the
purpose of the exercise.
We are now entering the age of widespread deployment of
cameras in police cars and even on police officers themselves. 113
113 Every state police agency has used some form of video recording system in patrol
cars and the International Association of Chiefs of Police estimates that nearly half of
police cars are equipped with a video camera. Matthew D. Thurlow, Lights, Camera,
Action: Video Cameras as Tools of Justice, 23 J. MARSHALL J. COMPUTER & INFO. L.
771, 795 (2005). For an extensive discussion of the use of officer-mounted cameras, see
David A. Harris, How Accountability-Based Policing Can Reinforce—Or Replace—The
Fourth Amendment Exclusionary Rule, 7 OHIO ST. J. CRIM. L. 149, 175-80 (2009). Civil
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Cameras are everywhere, and an increasing number of
departments and prosecutors have worked through the logistics of
using police cameras. With the widespread use of ever-cheaper
digital video, it is now clear that the costs of deploying cameras
can be managed, 114 and that protocols for handling discovery
issues can be developed. 115 Given the hidden costs of the current
regime, states should consider adopting policies that mandate the
use of video.
One objection to the use of video is cost, but the price of the
technology to capture and store video is dropping steadily and
should continue to drop as more vendors enter the market. 116
Cross-adoption of technology should also help. Anyone who has
purchased a smartphone in the last two years had the option of
purchasing one that recorded and transmitted video clips. Once it
becomes clear that there is a large enough market for a robust,
officer-worn video-recording device, competitors who have
developed hardware expertise in these other contexts will enter
the market, driving costs down even further.
Some of the more difficult obstacles to the adoption of video
remain cultural. Right now, many departments and police chiefs
are comfortable with video so long as they can decide when it is
used—to make cases and to protect their departments from false
liability claims. But the video has the potential to act as a doubleedged sword. There will be uses of police video in court not only for
departments when they are falsely accused of violating a suspect’s
rights or as evidence against defendants, but also against the
police when officers have in fact violated defendants’ rights, or the
libertarians have not been comfortable with cameras for other reasons, so their use will
remain controversial. For a discussion of the mechanics of digital camera deployment in
a broader context—and a critical view of widespread use of cameras without Fourth
Amendment regulation, see CHRISTOPHER SLOBOGIN, PRIVACY AT RISK: THE NEW
GOVERNMENT SURVEILLANCE AND THE FOURTH AMENDMENT 81-110 (2007); Christopher
Slobogin, Public Privacy: Camera Surveillance of Public Places and the Right to
Anonymity, 72 MISS. L.J. 213 (2002); Andrew E. Taslitz, The Fourth Amendment in the
Twenty-First Century: Technology, Privacy, and Human Emotions, 65 LAW & CONTEMP.
PROBS. 125, 152 (2002).
114 Thurlow, supra note 113, at 797.
115 I anticipate that the cameras will produce what will be another form of digital
evidence. See generally Orin S. Kerr, Digital Evidence and the New Criminal
Procedure, 105 COLUM. L. REV. 279 (2005) (discussing potential protocols for managing
digital evidence).
116 Thurlow, supra note 113, at 797.
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video is used as evidence by defense counsel in unforeseen
ways. 117 Departments that resist the deployment of cameras are
more worried about the perceived downside than the upside. 118
One underexplored upside is the one this Article explores.
There is plenty of doctrinal room within current Fourth
Amendment jurisprudence for the use of digital video as a
supplement to, or substitute for, police testimony. Using video will
also allow the new science on facial expression to be considered,
while subjecting it to judicial oversight, expert reexamination, and
public scrutiny. Having video available will also reduce the
problems with memory contamination explored above by
permitting officers to examine the video before testifying and
hopefully them from locking in to a verbal formulation of the event
that may not reflect reality. It should also simplify life for
prosecutors and defense attorneys. It will make cases based on
good stops easier to prove, and bad cases easier to weed out. This
rise in quality will lead to an increase in pretrial resolutions in
both directions, saving trial resources for cases where there are
genuine disputes. 119 Finally, video evidence will empower judges
to act in cases where officers are truly lying because it will obviate
the swearing contest between a police officer and an accused
criminal, and give judges much firmer footing on which to stand.
117 A 2004 study by the International Association of Chiefs of Police demonstrated
that ninety-seven percent of U.S. citizens responding to a poll supported the use of incar cameras for law enforcement. Colonel Thomas Hutchins, In-Car Cameras:
Executive Summary, in IACP/COPS TECHNOLOGY TECHNICAL ASSISTANCE PROGRAM:
TECHNOLOGY DESK REFERENCE 47 (2010) (“While law enforcement views the
acquisition of camera technology as a means to demonstrate their professionalism and
increase officer safety, the public views cameras as a means to guard against abuse.
Despite the difference in opinions, both the public and the police support use of the
technology making the acquisition and implementation of an in-car camera program a
win/win proposition for all.”).
118 Of course, for outsiders, accurate assessments of officer conduct are likely to be
seen as all upside, whether the camera reveals that the officer was good or bad.
119 This article is focused on the costs and benefits of the Terry regime. Cameras
have multiple other benefits for law enforcement. For example, they can provide clear
evidence in criminal trials and civil suits, resolve disciplinary complaints against
officers, allow oversight and training by supervisors, and increase public confidence
that officers are accountable. For further exploration of these issues, see David Harris,
Picture This: Body Worn Video (“Head Cams”) As Tools For Ensuring Fourth
Amendment Compliance By Police, 43 TEX. TECH L. REV. 357 (2010) (discussing the
various contexts in which video evidence would be useful).
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Whether and to what extent the evidentiary rules should
require video before permitting certain kinds of testimony, such as
the testimony on facial expression, remain open questions.

CONCLUSION
This Article has outlined some of the unexplored costs of the
Terry regime, built on the requirement of reasonable and
articulable suspicion. The current regime has flaws as practiced,
and a range of challenges coming that it must face. Research on
witness memory has demonstrated that there are contamination
effects that are a byproduct of the way we now practice Fourth
Amendment law. New pressures on the Terry regime are coming
from other directions as well. The federal government and the
police are training officers in new techniques based on advances in
cognitive and behavioral science that rely on officer observation of
suspect behavior, much of it subtle and operating in ways that the
suspects themselves do not realize. Inevitably, officers relying on
the new techniques will be bringing them into the courtroom,
where the doctrine will be forced to adapt. Terry as now practiced
may be giving us a false sense of security, while failing in two
directions simultaneously. It creates the sense that the courts are
meaningfully engaged in police oversight, leaving it less likely
that other administrative oversight methods will be adopted. The
current formulation may also be limiting perceptions about the
appropriate use of evidence in some subset of cases where a good,
but inarticulate officer engages in a search that we would like to
take place, and has the evidence suppressed because he is
inarticulate about his reasonable suspicion. Technology is also
increasing the range of evidence that is available to the courts
when deciding if officers acted reasonably. Rather than relying on
witness testimony alone, digital video is subjecting a wide range of
heretofore unavailable behavior to the courts. It is time to move
beyond the Terry formulation of the basis for police frisks. By
explicitly adopting a new standardreasonable suspicion
supported by credible evidencethe courts can make clear that
there is doctrinal room for technology, in the form of cameras
today and perhaps in other forms tomorrow, to help ameliorate
the limitations of human memory, while allowing society the
benefit of other advances in our knowledge of cognitive science.

